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There has been a lot of interest lately in evolutionary game theory. In particular,
there have been some attempts to use evolutionary concepts in order to make a
selection among the set of Nash equilibria. One of these concepts was introduced
by Foster and Young (1990) and is known as stochastic stability. Unlike the
concept of evolutionary stability, which requires from a population to be immune
to isolated random mutations, stochastic stability requires immunity against
persistent random mutations. This concept was successfully applied by Kandori
et al. (1993) in the analysis of symmetric 2  2 games, by Young (1993a) for
weakly acyclic n person games, by Young (1993b) in the analysis of bargaining,
and by Vega-Redondo (1996) in the analysis of competition among rms.
As Young (1998) stresses, the stochastic stability approach can be applied
to the analysis of a variety of social interactions, and not only to the adaptive
playing of games. In this paper we are interested in applying the concept of
stochastic stability to the simple housing market introduced by Shapley and
Scarf (1974). A housing market consists of n traders, each of whom is charac-
terized by the only house he owns and by his complete, transitive and antisym-
metric preference relation over the set of houses. In order to apply the concept
of stochastic stability, we endow the housing market with a simple perturbed
stochastic dynamic process. The unperturbed process can be described as fol-
lows. At each period a pair of traders is matched randomly and they trade their
endowments if and only if the trade is mutually benecial. The perturbation of
the process consists of allowing a small probability of trade when it is not mutu-
ally benecial. We want to see whether there is any relation between the ecient
allocations in the economy and the set of stochastically stable outcomes of the
process. We show that the ecient allocations are always stochastically stable.
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1Further, we nd that in economies with three traders, the set of stochastically
stable states coincides with the set of ecient allocations. However, when there
are more than three agents, there might be stochastically stable states which
are inecient.
We view the analysis of the simple housing market as a rst step into the
analysis of more general exchange economies. Our result though, gives little
hope of nding some evolutionary foundation of ecient allocations, not to
speak of Walrasian allocations.
2 The Model and Preliminary Results
A house allocation problem is a triple hN;H;(i)i2Ni where N = f1;:::;ng is
a nite set of individuals, H = fh1;:::;hng is a nite set of houses and for each
individual i 2 N, i is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric preference
relations over H. The size of the problem is the number of agents in it.
Let P be a house allocation problem. An allocation in P is a one to one
function x : N ! H that assigns one house to each agent.
An allocation x is ecient if there is no allocation y such that yi i xi for
all i 2 N and yi i xi for some i 2 N.
Let x be an allocation in P. We say that individual i envies individual j at x
if and only if xj i xi. Dene the envy-graph of allocation x to be the directed
graph whose vertices are the agents in the housing problem and there is an edge
from agent i to agent j if and only if i envies j. It is clear that allocation x is
ecient if and only if the corresponding envy-graph is acyclic.
The ecient allocations can also be characterized by means of the serial
dictatorship mechanisms. Let  : f1;:::;ng ! N be an ordering of the traders,
i.e., (1) is the rst trader, (2) is the second trader and so on. We say that
allocation x is the outcome of the serial dictatorship mechanism with respect to
 or that x is induced by , for short, if
 x(1) is agent (1)'s most preferred element in H
 for t 2 f2;:::;ng, x(t) is agent (t)'s preferred element in H n
fx(1);:::;x(t 1)g.
It is known that allocation x is ecient if and only if it is the outcome of the
serial dictatorship mechanism with respect to some ordering of the traders.
We shall dene a dynamic process according to which agents perform bilat-
eral trades. These bilateral trades will allow us to transit from one allocation
to the other. Clearly, it is not always possible to go from one allocation to
another by means of a single bilateral trade. When it is possible, we say that
the allocations are pairwise connected. More formally, we say that allocations
x and y are pairwise connected if there is a pair i and j of agents such that
xi = yj, xj = yi and xk = yk for all k = 2 fi;jg. A (x;y)-path is a nite sequence
of allocations (z0;z1;:::;zk) such that z0 = x, zk = y and for t = 0;1;:::;k 1,
zt and zt+1 are pairwise connected. The following lemma shows that the set of
ecient allocations is \connected".
2Lemma 1 Let P = hN;H;(i)i2Ni be a house allocation problem and let x
and y be two ecient allocations in P. Then, there is an (x;y)-path composed
exclusively of ecient allocations.
Proof : The proof is by induction on the size of the problem. If the problem
consists of one agent, there is nothing to prove because the only allocation
is ecient. Assume that the claim holds for all problems of size K, let E =
hN;H;(i)i2Ni be a problem of size K + 1 and let x and y be two ecient
allocations in it.
Case 1: There is an agent, k 2 N, who gets his most preferred house both at
x and y. Namely, xk = yk k h for all h 2 H. Then, there are orderings  and
 of the traders, both with trader k on top of them, which induce allocations
x and y, respectively. Let N0 = N n fkg, H0 = H n fxkg and consider the
subproblem E0 = hN0;H0;(i jH0)i2N0i, where i jH0 is the restriction of i's
preferences to H0. The allocations xjN0 and yj0
N are ecient in E0 since they
are induced by the orderings  and  respectively, restricted to the agents in
S. Since E0 is an economy of size K, by the induction hypothesis, there is a
path (^ x0;::: ^ xm) of ecient allocations in E0 from xjN0 to yjN0. Dene now the





i if i 2 S
xk if i = k
for t = 0;:::;m. The sequence (x0;:::;xm) is a (x;y)-path of ecient allo-
cations in E since they are induced by the orderings that induce (^ x0;::: ^ xm),
respectively, after adding agent k to the top.
Case 2: There is no agent that gets his most preferred house both at x and at
y. There are orderings  and  of the traders which induce allocations x and
y, respectively. Let k the rst agent in the order , namely (1) = k. Clearly,
k is not the rst agent in the order . Without loss of generality assume that
 is the natural order, (t) = t. Therefore (1) = 1 6= k. Since k does not get
his most preferred house in x, there must be an agent ` < k who has k's most
preferred house. Namely, x` = yk.
Case 2.1: ` > 1. In this case, agent `'s and agent k's respective most preferred
houses dier. This implies that there is an allocation z, which is ecient in E,
and at which both agent ` and agent k get their respective most preferred houses.
Since agent ` gets his most preferred house both at ecient allocation x and
at ecient allocation z, by case 1, there is a (x;z)-path of ecient allocations.
But since k gets his most preferred house both at z and at y, by case 1 again
there is a (z;y)-path of ecient allocations. Joining both paths, we conclude
that there is a (z;y)-path of ecient allocations.
Case 2.2: ` = 1. In this case x awards agent ` the house that is most preferred
by both ` and k. Consider an ordering  of the agents in which agent ` is rst
and agent k is last and let z be the ecient allocation induced by that ordering.
Since agent ` gets his most preferred house both at x and at z, by case 1, there
is a (x;z)-path of ecient allocations. Let z0 be the allocation that is obtained
3from z after agents ` and k switch houses. Allocation z0 is ecient because it
is induced by the ordering that is obtained from  after ` and i switch places.
Therefore, z and z0 are two pairwise connected ecient allocations. Clearly,
z0 awards agent k his most preferred house. Therefore, by case 1 again, there
is a (z0;y)-path of ecient allocations. We have built then a path of ecient
allocations that connects x with y. 2
3 The Dynamic Process
Given a house allocation problem we want to dene a perturbed Markov process
as dened in Young (1998) where the states are the allocations of the housing
problem. In each period one pair of agents is selected at random, where all
pairs are equally likely to be chosen. Consider a pair of individuals, say i and
j. The probability that they trade depends on the degree of advantageousness
of the trade. If the trade is mutually benecial, then it takes place with high
probability, say 1. If the trade is not mutually benecial, then it takes place with
a very low probability. Specically, assume that if the trade is advantageous for
only one trader, the trade takes place with probability  and if the trade is
disadvantageous for both traders, it takes place with probability 2.
It can be checked that a state of the unperturbed process is absorbing if and
only if there is no pair of agents that envy each other. It turns out that the
absorbing states constitute the only recurrent classes of the process.
Proposition 1 The recurrent classes of the unperturbed process are the sin-
gletons containing the absorbing states.
Proof : It is clear that a singleton containing an absorbing state is a recurrent
class. Conversely, assume that x is an allocation where there are at least two
agents that envy each other. Then, with positive probability they will meet and
trade. The number of pairs of agents that envy each other will be reduced by at
least one as a result of the trade. If the resulting allocation is an absorbing state,
we are done. Otherwise, there is a positive probability that two individuals that
envy each other meet and trade, thus reducing the number of pairs that envy
each other. Continuing in this fashion, we see that there is a positive probability
that an absorbing state is reached which shows that x does not belong to a
recurrent class. 2
We are interested in the stochastically stable states of the perturbed Markov
process dened above. For any two allocations x and y, dene the resistance
of the transition x ! y as follows: if x and y are pairwise connected, then the
resistance is the number of agents (0, 1, or 2) that nd the bilateral trade unprof-
itable. Otherwise dene the resistance to be 1. Similarly, let  = (zi;:::;zj)
4be an (x;y)-path. The resistance of the path  is the sum of the resistances of
its transitions.
Let Z0 = fz1;:::zng be the set of absorbing states of the unperturbed
process and consider the complete directed graph with vertex set Z0, which is
denoted by  . We want to dene the resistance of each one of the edges in
this graph. For this, let zi and zj be two elements of Z0. The resistance of
the edge (zi;zj) in   is the minimum resistance over all the resistances of the
(zi;zj)-paths. Let zi be an absorbing state. A zi-tree is a tree with vertex set
Z0 such that from every vertex dierent from zi, there is a unique directed path
in the tree to zi. The resistance of the zi-tree is the sum of the resistances of
the edges that compose it. The stochastic potential of the absorbing state zi is
the minimum resistance over all the zi-trees. The stochastically stable states are
those states with minimum stochastic potential. The following lemma will be
useful.
Lemma 2 Let x be a stochastically stable state and let y be an absorbing state
such that the edge (x;y) has resistance 1. Then, y is a stochastically stable state.
Proof : Let T be an x-tree with minimum resistance over all the x-trees. Let
s(y) denote the immediate successor of y in the unique path that connects y to
x. Build a new tree T0 by deleting from T the edge (y;s(y)) and adding the edge
(x;y). It can be seen that T0 is a y-tree. Indeed, if there was a directed path in
T from z to y, the same path connects z to y in T0. And if there was a directed
path in T from z to x that did not go through y, now the path that is obtained
from that path by adding the edge (x;y), is a directed path in T0 that connects
z to y. T0 is a y-tree that is obtained from T by adding an edge of resistance 1
and deleting one edge of resistance greater or equal 1. Therefore, the resistance
of T0 is less or equal the resistance of T. But since T is an x-tree with minimum
resistance over all the x-trees and since x is a stochastically stable state, the
resistance of T0 equals the resistance of T and therefore y is a stochastically
stable state. 2
Corollary 1 If there is an ecient allocation that is stochastically stable, then
all ecient allocations are stochastically stable.
Proof : Let x be an ecient allocation that is stochastically stable and let
y be another ecient allocation. By Lemma 1, there is a (x;y)-path of e-
cient allocations. Every edge along this path has resistance 1. By Lemma 2,
all the ecient allocations along this path, and in particular allocation y, are
stochastically stable. 2
We are now ready to state one of the main results of the paper.
5Proposition 2 Let P be a problem with 3 agents. The stochastically stable
states of the corresponding perturbed Markov process are all the ecient allo-
cations.
Proof : Let Z0 be the set of absorbing states. The set Z0 can be written as
Z0 = ZE [ ZI where ZE is the set of ecient allocations and ZI is the set of
absorbing states that are not ecient. It is known that ZE 6= ; but ZI may be
empty.
Case 1: ZI 6= ;.
This means that there is an inecient allocation at which no two agents envy






Namely each agent envies one and only one agent and no two agents envy
each other. But in this case, by executing the advantageous trilateral trade,
each agent ends up with its most preferred house. Consequently, this resulting
allocation is the only ecient one. Therefore Z0 consists of 2 states: the ecient
one, ze and the inecient one, zi.
In order to show that the ecient allocation is the only stochastically stable
state, we shall show a path from the inecient state to the ecient one that has
resistance 1 and we shall show that every path from the ecient state to the
inecient one must have a resistance of at least 3. Starting from the inecient
allocation, execute the advantageous trilateral trade by letting agents i and k
trade rst and then letting agents i and j trade. The rst trade has a resistance
1 and the second has a resistance 0 (since it is mutually benecial for both i and
j). Therefore the corresponding path from the inecient state to the ecient
one has resistance 1 and since any path from one recurrent class to another
must have a resistance of at least one, the stochastic potential of the ecient
allocation is 1.
We shall show now that any path from the ecient state to the inecient
one has a resistance of at least 3. To see this, note that in order for each of the
three traders to end up with a house that is less preferred than the initial one,
each of them must execute at least one disadvantageous trade. Consequently,
the stochastic potential of the inecient absorbing state must be at least 3. The
ecient state minimizes the stochastic potential over the absorbing states and
therefore it is the only stochastically stable state.
6Case 2: ZI = ;. In this case, since the set of stochastically stable states is
nonempty, it must contain at least one ecient allocation. Then, by Corollary 1,
all the ecient allocations are stochastically stable. 2
Unfortunately, Proposition 2 cannot be generalized to economies with more






In this economy there are six absorbing states, ve of which are ecient alloca-
tions.
Agents
Allocation 1 2 3 4
z0 h1 h2 h3 h4
z1 h1 h3 h4 h2
z2 h2 h1 h3 h4
z3 h2 h1 h4 h3
z4 h2 h3 h4 h1
z5 h3 h1 h4 h2
Table 1: Absorbing states
We will show that the inecient allocation z0 is stochastically stable by
showing a z0-tree with a resistance of 5, which is the minimum resistance that
a z-tree with 6 vertices can possibly have. This will mean that the inecient
allocation has minimum stochastic potential and therefore it is stochastically




























7To see that each of the directed edges zi ! zj in the above tree have a weight
of 1, note that one can move from allocation zi to allocation zj by means of one
bilateral trade with resistance 1.
We have seen that if an ecient allocation is stochastically stable, so are all
the ecient allocations. One may ask whether it is possible that no ecient
allocation is stochastically stable. The following proposition shows that this is
impossible.
Proposition 3 The set of stochastically stable allocations contains all the ef-
cient allocations.
Proof : Given Corollary 1, it is enough to show that there is one ecient
allocation that is stochastically stable. Pick a stochastically stable allocation,
x. If x is ecient we are done, so assume it is not ecient. If we show that
there is a path from x to an ecient allocation, such that each of its transitions
has resistance less or equal 1, we are done, because by Lemma 2 the ecient
allocation will be stochastically stable. The existence of the required path is an
immediate consequence of the following:
Lemma 3 Let x be an absorbing state that is not ecient and let m  3 be
the number of agents that belong to some cycle of x's envy-graph. Then, there
is an absorbing state y such that the edge (x;y) has resistance 1 and such that
the number of agents who belong to some cycle of y's envy graph is less than
m.
Proof : Let A1 be the set of agents that are allocated their most preferred
house under allocation x and let B1 be the complement of A1:
A1 = fi 2 A : xi i xj 8j 2 Ng
B1 = N n A1:
Dene recursively the following set of agents: for k = 1;2;:::
Ak+1 = fi 2 Bk : xiPixj 8j 2 Bkg
Bk+1 = Bk n Ak+1:
Let A = [1
k=1Ak. It is immediate that the agents in A do not belong to any
cycle of the envy-graph of x. Since x is not ecient, B = N n A 6= ;. B is the
set of agents that belong to a cycle of the envy-graph of x. Therefore m = jBj.
It is also clear that no agent in A envies anybody in B. Let i 2 B. Then there is
an agent in B who is envied by i. Let j be the agent who owns the i-maximal
house in the set of houses that belong to agents in B. That is, xj i xt for
all t 2 B. Let x0 be the allocation that is obtained from x after i and j trade.
At this allocation, no agent in A [ fig envies anybody in Bk n fig. Therefore,
the number of agents that belong to a cycle in the envy-graph of x0 is less or
8equal jBk n figj which is less than jBkj = m. If x0 is absorbing, then we are
done. Otherwise, there is a (x0;y)-path from x0 to some absorbing state y with
resistance 0. Clearly, the number of agents that belong to a cycle of the envy
graph of y is less that jBkj = m. 2
This completes the proof of the proposition. 2
References
Foster, D. P. and H. P. Young (1990), \Stochastic evolutionary game dynam-
ics," Theoretical Population Biology 38, 219{232.
Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993), \Learning, mutations and long
run equilibria in games," Econometrica 61, 29{56.
Shapley, L. and H. Scarf (1974), \On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Math-
ematical Economics 1, 23{28.
Vega-Redondo, F. (1996), \The evolution of Walrasian behavior," Economet-
rica 65, 375{384.
Young, H. P. (1993a), \The evolution of conventions," Econometrica 61, 57{84.
Young, H. P. (1993b), \An evolutionary model of bargaining," Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 59, 145{168.
Young, H. P. (1998), Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ.
9